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International Space Station
Elements currently in orbit
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Current Stats
At
Today Percent Complete
Weight (lbs) 74,000 7.4% -1 Million
Volume (ct) 5,045 12.0% 43,000
Power (kw) 2 1.4% 110
Atmosphere (psi) 14.7 yes 14.7
Inclination (degrees) 51.6 yes 51.6
Altitude (miles) 220 yes 220
Crew (persons) 0 0.0% 7
Assembly Flights 3 4.3% 46
At Complete
International Space Station
Data Points
• FGB / first element launch: November 20, 1998
• Node1, PMA1 7 & PMA2 launch: December 4, 1998
• Assembly complete surface area: 12,000 square meters
• :service life: 15 years
• Meteoroid / orbital debris shielding
— Weight of dedicated shield, support structure, or primary structure mods
• 3Ok - 4Ok pounds at assembly complete
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• 1983	 Space Station Phase A
• 1984/
	 Space Station Phase B
1985
• 1987	 Space Station Integrated Wall Damage and Penetration
Damage Control Contract (Bumper code development)
• 1987	 Space Station Phase C/D (Inhabited Modules) Contract
• 1993/
	 International Space Station Prime Contract
1994	 (Integration role)
• 2000	 Space and Air Survivability Workshop 2000
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Today's Boeing
Company Capabilities
^
a^p
U O
C. cn
N v
rn
> OU CD-0
E
In
O
U
C
CU
>
ca
Q u7
Nca r—
L
O cn i O
NQ 0 N (Q
_
N Q
N
E
>`
a.
Q
CU O O w
.O ++ O r
'^
^ U U >+
Site
°' 'a_ .^
O^. U.0 (n ^ — ia) iO w
O >, >.
> (n a w U t-- U) = _
Canoga Park X X X X
Colorado Springs X X
Downey X X X X
Houston X X X X X
Huntington Beach X X X X X
Huntsville X X X X
Seattle X X X
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Presentation Outline
• Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
• Shield development
• Component vulnerability
• rather
• Concluding remarks
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Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
• Shield development
• component vulnerability
• Other
• Concluding remarks
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O` Space Environments
Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris
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Space Environments
Neutral Atmosphere and Atomic Oxygen
• Natural Atmosphere
-Vacuum Venting
-Transfer Vehicle Operations
•Reboost / attitude control
-Payload Operations r°
-Off-gas / Out-gas
-Leaks
•EV A/Airlock
o
n
Neutral
Atnx)sphere
rosoEnvironment
am / Wake
fF
eposition
-Structures c
-Solar Arrays o.
-Surface Materials o
-Payloads U
-LEO Natural Atmosphere	 7
0
rn
C
• llirect impingement
Atomic
•High Velocity Impact with
rail surfaces Oxygen
*Excited species generation Environment
causing surface glow
-Surface Materials v
•Solar Arrays o
•Optic"ll Sensols a
E
•Payloads
U
-Lubricants
•EVA wits
-Contamination
-Material erosion and loss
-Reflectance
-Coating loss, degradation, or discol oration
•Absorbtivity
-Power loss from solar arrays
• -niissivity
.^
-Changes in exposed surface optical properties
v0^ -Material Loss Uo  •Spacecraft glow
• coating loss
W ne,mai Control• r,`^V
'ln ccuracl1lallUll
Accuracy
•111M1umcntation
•sCIISIIIVIIy
-Accuracy
-Field ofobstruction and interference
-Sensitivity
-increase of local particulatecontanlination
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External
Contaminalion
Environment
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-Material outgassing
and offgassing
-Ground processing
and non-volatile residue.
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• I'articulate/non-volatile residue
redistribution
•Line-of-sight deposition
-Ambient scattering
• UV-enhanced deposition
-Interaction with atomic oxygen
-Surface Materials
-Solar Arrays
-Radiators
-Optical Sensors
•Payloads
-Thermal and optical property changes
-Material loss
v -Coming loss or degradation
4>	 •power loss from solar arrays
*Instrumentation
-Accuracy
-Sensitivity
-Field ofobstmction and interference
•Electrostatic charging of contaminant
Space Environments
External Contamination and Ionizing Radiation
.Cosmic rays	 I	 I
-Solar flare
	
u
-Trapped belt
-Electrons/protons (South
Atlantic Anomaly/Trapped Wit)
-On-board sources
•Upset	
°o	 Ionizing
•Latchul'
	 Radiation
-Burnout
	 Environmentv
-Total dose
-Cancer induction
•MTL degradation
(bond hrcaking)
-Create color centers
c
-Electronics v
-Crew
-Optical materials o
-Solar arrays U
-polymers
-inoperable systems
• IZclx)ot / reset
U
-Component replacement
• I?VA duty limits i long tern, effects
.Degradation
-Discoloration
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Space Environments
Plasma and Thermal
^^ BBE1/i3.^'a
-Natural Plasma 'Sol`"
-UV ionizations •Garth alhcdo
-Solar Arrays -Earth IR
-Charge exchange c -Spacecraft self radiation ^ 
•Experiments/Probes/EMsources C/) • Plasma currents
-Charge balance o
-Discharges: corona, are
•Radiation heat transfer
	
`Thermal
-Currents: conductors, dielectrics o	 Plasnm
 VxB, E, B v^	 Environment °J	 Environment$
-Sheaths
•SpUIICI'Illg -Surface materials
-Ram / wake -insulation 
-Photoelectron emission -Pressurized elements
-Secondary electron generation -Payloads
• Iligh pressure tanks 	 o
-Radiators	 n
-Solar Arrays rZ
-Power distribution
*Structures co
U
ransport system
-Electronics
-Cabling o
-Antennas U
•Payloads
.Over heating or cooling
-Power loss -Surface property degradation
I	 • Pinhole growth N	 -Subsystem failure
L -Changes in optical properties -Component reliahility
.1m •1';IYlood pri fol imince
kl	
-Torque and drag •Crew comfort
-Enhanced contamination *Degradation of optical properties
• Instrumentation corruption •Ulility placement and routing
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Thermal Vacuum and Meteoroids/Orbital Debris
e_ ""ALFZ V"
-Exposed materials
-Multi-layer insulation
-Seals
-Lubricants
-Crew / EVA suits
-Solar arrays
-Optical sensors
Thermal control
c
C0a
0
U
-Satellite break-up
-Break-up and fragmentation
of upper stages
•ASAT operations
-On-orbit collisions of debris
-Interplanetary Dust
-Asteroid belt
o •Comet dustThermal MeteoroidsVacuum Im tuts
I
•° and Orbitalw	 Environment
5 •Perforations  Debris
-Craters y Environment
-Ricochet ar
-Debris shield
• )\1LI	 C
v
-Strictures	
o
-External components
• Payloads	 o
-Crew	 U
-Solar arrays
-Radiators
-Space vacuum and
thermal radiation sources
(See Thermal Environment
•Outgassi ng
-Evaporation
-Sublimation
2	 -Material constituent loss
Cj	 -Moisture loss
.Degradation of properties
w -Contamination
-Structural failure / pressure loss
,^2 -Degradation of optical properties of exposed equipment
v -Component failure and degradation
•E,VA thient
4^
	 -Sul face coaling penetration
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Space Station Environments
-T'	 Summary
• Any of the assessed environments can degrade mission performance
and/or result in mission loss with improper design
• In general, meteoroids / orbital debris and ionizing radiation are the two
natural and induced environments that pose survivability and
vulnerability concerns
• Worst case threats posed by ionizing radiation can be mitigated by
design
• Worst case meteoroid / orbital debris threats cannot be fully mitigated
with current design practices
— Typically and fortunately, the probability of a mission ending impact is
relatively low
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Presentation Outline
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• Space station natural and induced environments
Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
• Shield development
• Component vulnerability
• Other
• Concluding remarks
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Legend:
A - Pressure vessel
penetrations
highly unlikely
B - Possible penetrations
depending on impacted
region and impacting particle.
Likelihood generally
increases as you move
to the right. Often can be
mitigated with passive shields.
S1111scripts:
f - functional failure onset
p - pressure vessel penetration
onset
C - No existing countermeasures
D - Ground tracking for collision
avoidance transition region.
85%n confidence at 10 cm
(600 km alt) to 95% at 30 cm.
Ground tracked objects
will be avoided based on
collision probability.
E - Fligh confidence ground
tracking for collision
avoidance maneuver.
Comparative Orbital Debris and Meteoroid with SSP 30425
Orbital Debris Environment Shown
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Threat Definition
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• SSP 30425 environment models
— Meteoroids and orbital debris
— Models defined on Boeing contract
— Design of shields
• ORDEM96
— Orbital debris only
— 1996 update to NASA orbital debris model
• ORDEM2K currently under development by NASA
— Component vulnerability analyses
— Performance assessments
— Catastrophic risk assessments
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• Space station natural and induced environments
•	 Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
• Shield development
• Component vulnerability
• Other
• Concluding remarks
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• Requirement Definition
-- Probability of no catastrophic failure (PNCF)
-- Probability of no penetration (PNP)
Probability of no subcomponent penetration (PNSP)
— M/OD critical item
• An item is defined as M/OD critical when effects resulting from meteoroid or
orbital debris impact will endanger the crew or Space Station survivability
n Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris6/14/00 19
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Requirement Definition
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• Probability of no penetration (PNP)
— Penetration of pressure wall of a pressurized element or other high
energy device
— ISS specification is 0.76 for 10 years
• Design requirements based on SSP 30425 environment models
— 1991 orbital debris environment definition
— PNP=e-n
• Where n = f * a * t = the expected number of perforations
Similarity to
Probability
of no
Impact
— f = penetrating flux
— a = exposed critical area
— t = exposure time
• Probability of no catastrophic failure
— Program requirement is 0.95 for 10 years
PNCF = PNPR = e -fatR
• R = number of catastrophic events per penetration
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• Probability of No Penetration
— Limited to the performance of the WOD protection subsystem
• Shield performance testing
• Shield performance equations
• Probabilities of shield system failure based on shield performance and
environment
• Probability of No Catastrophic Failure
— Assessment of the effects of a penetration of a WOD critical item
• Includes effects of crew responsive
• Generalized characterization of effects of a penetration on ISS systems
• Currently assessed
— Unzipping event
	
- Critical equipment loss
— Thrust induced structural failure	 - Hypoxia related losses
— Fragment injury loss	 - Secondary injury loss
• Assessed but not included in catastrophic risk tally
— Critical module depressurization	 - Non-fatal injuries
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• Probability of no subcomponent penetration
— Lesson learned
— Partially implemented due to "pre-existing hardware" and other constraints
MTBF (hours) <50,000 50,000 to 872,000 >872,000
System-level Criticality
1 (0.999898) area(" n2) (0.999898) "rc"0112) (0.999898) area(m2 )
1 R 0.84 365*24 0.99
mtbf (hours)
exp
2 0.7 2*365*24 0.98
exp(	 ni,bf(hourc))
2R 0. 6 3*365*24 0.97
exp(	 mrbf(hours))
3 0.5 _	 4 *365w24 0.96
ors))
exp( ;nfbf(hu
Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris
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Requirement Definition
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• Penetration
Defined as through hole or detached spall
• Through hole determined by light tightness or dye penetrant
High pressure vessel or high energy device penetration defined as
perforation of last wall of shield system, not tank or device wall
• Examples
— Plasma contactor xenon tank (3000 psi)
— Control moment gyros
• Subcomponent Penetration is defined as:
Partin/ implementation
— Complete perforation
— Creation of detached spall
— For close-clearance items that could be affected by case deformation, a
deformation equal to one-half the case thickness or any impingement into
the dynamic envelope between the case and the protected component
— For cables, a complete severing of a wire or a reduction in its cross-
sectional area by 30% or greater
— Reduction in wall thickness such that design pressure would no longer be
contained
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Presentation Outline
• Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
====> Assessment methods
• Shield development
• Component vulnerability
• Other
• Concluding remarks
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Assessment methods
• Analysis codes
— Bumper-II software
• Probability of no penetration
• Probability of no subcomponent penetration
• Probability of no impact
— MSCSury
• Probability of no catastrophic failure
• Testing
— Hypervelocity impact testing
• Two stage light gas gun to 7 km/sec
— Aluminum spheres
• Limited inhibited shaped charge shots at 11 km/sec
— Hollow aluminum cylindrical projectiles
— Test data used to formulate shield performance equations
• Coded into Bumper-II and MSCSury
Meteoroid /Orbital Debris6/14/00
	 25	 Survivability and Vulnerability
f 
f,,^
	
Bumper Shield Assessment Methodology
Spacecraft Configuration (I-DEAS) Meteoroid & Debris Environments (GEOMETRY)
• Threat directions
z°°°h• Velocity distribution
• Shadowing 1	 tt,_m°I Fame^b
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•	 1	 dc^
1^ r
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I-DEAS Finite Element Model ^^w
• Describes spatial relationships of spacecraft components
• Defines spacecraft orientation (velocity and zenith directions)
• Defines WOD shield regions
Critical Particle Diameter Calculation (RESPONSE) Computation of Penetrating Flux and PNP (SHIELD)
Protection capability Graphical Interpretation of Results (EXCEL & I-DEAS)
Whipple Shield f3aiiistic limit
	 ^,
n(failure above Ilnes)
Space Station OI ital Debris Threat Assessment
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Spacecraft and Crcw Loss Model
• MSCSury
 cascades from "immediate" failure modes (such as critical cracking of the module) to "later" hazards (such as crew hypoxia).
Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris
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YES
ARE RESULTS	
STOP
ACCEPTABLE?
NO
NO
ACCEPTABLE OPTIONS
FOR MITIGATING RISK
CALCULATE HAZARD
PROBABILITY
Boeing Space Station Survivability and Vulnerability
Assessment Method Process Flow
ACCEPTABLE RISK
DEFINITION
ENVIRONMENTAL
MODEL
00 F IMPACT	 PENETRATION
TESTING	 MECHANICS
M/OD
ASSESSMENT
SPACECRAFT
CONFIGURATIONFIND CRITICAL
DEFINITION 	 PARTICLES	 —^
1
SYSTEM 	 FAILURE
ANALYSES
	
MODE DEFINITION
11 YES I
FMEA & HAZARD
	
TRADE STUDIES
ANALYSIS	 ON ORBIT DETECTION & REPAIR
FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS
• HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS
MISSION PARAMETER
	 ETC
DEFINITION
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Presentation Outline
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• Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
Shield development
• Component vulnerability
• Other
• Concluding remarks
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Shield Development
• Ballistic limit equation development
• Designing to a probabilistic requirement
• Shi eld design considerations
•	 Shield qualification
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Shield Development
Ballistic limit equation development
( "",,&FZAV"
• Hypervelocity impact tests parameters
— Solid, spherical, aluminum projectiles
— Impact velocities to 7 km/sec
— Destructive tests: 2 - 3 times as many targets as required data points
— Typical test matrix
• 3, 5, and 7 Km/sec
• Impact angles: 0°, 30°, & 60°
• Three shots per ballistic limit point to find failure point
• Built starting with existing database
— Whipple shield impact data
Approximately 50 test articles
per shield configuration
for performance equations
for ideal case
• Generalized shape of curve based on NASA shield concept testing
• Test types
— Development
— Pre-declared development
— Certification
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Designing to a probabilistic requirement
•	 Flexibility to designer
— Allows shield layout adjustment to accommodate other design requirements
— Allows probability matching
— Allows for the introduction of localized weak spots	 ..r•.,,'.
— Allowed wide diversity in number of ISS shield types	 Module	 Mod„ de
Cross-section Sa	 Cross-.Vcclion
— Not good where a specific design solution is desired	 Case A a	 Case I?
Design / development approach`
— Ballistic limit equations for conceptual design
— Initial assessment (ideally at SRR) of performance against spec
— Allow margin for changes associated with maturing design
• Coverage
• Certification tests
• Process specification / manufacturability issues
• Programmatic changes
Meteoroid / Orbital Debris
6/14/00	 32	 Survivability and Vulnerability
ift-^ Boeing Space Station Survivability and Vulnerability
r },	 Shield Developmen t
Top Shield Design Considerations and Issues
row
• Weight
• Static discharge
• Ascent venting
— Blanket
— Outer shield
• Touch temperature
• Intermediate Nextel/Kevlar blanket per "customer request"
• Contamination
— Kevlar, Nextel sizing
• Blanket fabrication
• Brackets for intermediate shielding "anywhere" on cylinder 	
A Design
Program
• Assembly sequence and configuration changes due to self shadowing
• Late design modifications or operational changes that removed shielding
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Shield Development
Shield Design
LAB PRIMARY DEBRIS SHIELD, INTERMEDIATE DEBRIS SHIELD
& MLI BLANKET INSTALLATION
Tridair
Fastener	 PRIMARY DEBRIS
SHIELD (Al)
BOXBEAM
Secondary Structure
(AI )	 \
Quarter-Turn
Fasteners
Primary Debris
Shield Bracket
(AI)
LONGERON CAP
Primary Structure
MLI
	
MLI
INTERMEDIATE DEBRIS SHIELD
Kevlar/Nextel Blanket
SHELL	 Tridair —
1.9 in.	 Fastener
4.1 in.	 Intermediate Debris Shield
Stave (Stainless)
	
	
Intermediate Debris Shield -
Bracket (AI)
Intermediate Debris Shield	 Note: Similar MLI Bracket (AI)
Bracket (Ti)	 Omitted for Clarity
MLI BEAM
WRAP
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Shield Qualification
;/'•^B, l^E/.N.G
• Verified by analysis supported by test data
• Shield certification tests performed on "flight-like" hardware
— Material certification records
• Ideally from same mill run
— Full participation of Quality Assurance
• Checked test articles compared to test control documentation
• Checked off on each step of test procedures
• Test facility requirements
— Tests [parameters] are repeatable
— Projectile velocity validated by at least two independent methods
— Integrity of the projectile prior to impact must be verifiable
— Test must be "clean"
• No other material such as sabot material, piece of burst valve, piston material, etc.
has impacted the test sample
Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris
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• Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
• Shield development
===::> Component vulnerability
• Other
• Concluding remarks
Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris6/14/00 36	 Survivability And Vulnerability
Boeing Space Station Survivability and vulnerability
Component Vulnerability
"Just tell me which (wire, tube, box, etc.) is going to break and we will shield it. "
ISS SO Truss Segntcnt during coin policnt inslallaliiin :i1 hcnncdy'space I' Iil,lit Canter
rn ,,, ,,.	 Nn.c^
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Component Vulnerabilityp	 y
What was tested and/or analyzed
• Wiring
1553 data cables (22 gauge)
Small power cables (8 gauge)
Large power cables (4 gauge)
Configuration / implementation
• Wire harnesses, Remote Manil
Powered
and
rc^ipmvered
Vator Arm
• Stainless tubing
- 0.028" thick ammonia lines
• Crew return vehicle thermal protection materials
• EVA suit materials
• Solar alpha rotary joint
• Radiator configurations
• Solar array materials
• Composite tubes
• Slidewire cord
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Component Vulnerability
What was found
• Most vulnerable components
— 1553 data cables
— Stainless tubing
• Failure modes
— EM shielding on 1553 cables shorted to conductor upon impact
— Holes in tubing
• surprises
— Beta cloth shroud on SO increased failing particle size (for unprotected
1553) from -0.35 mm to -2 mm based on test results
— Beta cloth wrap on tubing increased failing particle size from -0.35 mm to
-1 mm
Meteoroid / Orbital Debris
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Presentation Outline
• Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• Assessment methods
• Shield development
• Component vulnerability
Other
• Concluding remarks
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Other
• Ground-tracked objects collision avoidance
— -1% risk of collision without collision avoidance
• -112% for manned modules without collision avoidance
• Leak location, leak detection, and repair
— Common repair kit under development
— Methods to detect and isolate hole under development
• Unstable crack growth mitigation
— Drove change in thickness of cylindrical section of pressure wall
• 0.125" to 0.188" on US, European, and Japanese modules
— Implemented via contract direction
• Difficulties in implementing requirement
• Upon determination that tooling could handle additional thickness, minimal impact
— Russian design not susceptible to unstable crack growth
• Softer alloy (AMg6)
• Closely spaced rib pattern
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Boeing Space Station Survivability and Vulnerability
Presentation Outline
• Space station natural and induced environments
• Meteoroid and orbital debris threat definition
• Requirement definition
• .Assessment methods
• Shield development
• Component vulnerability
• Other
Concluding remarks
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Abbb- Concluding Remarks
Boeing Space Station
Space environments
Threat environments
Boeing's development approach
Worksho^^
Summarize
environmental hazards
and directed threats
to commercial and military
spacecraft performance
Explore how aircraft survivability
analysis and enhancement methodologies
may be applied to improve spacecraft
survivability from these hazards
Discuss current
spacecraft and aircraft
survivability analysis
methods, tools, and testing
Established processes
*Testing
*Assessment
*Shield design and fabrication
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e .^
Supporting Material
Meteoroid/ Orbital Debris
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Reduce P penetration/impact
Which is to say Increase PNP
Reduce P loss/penetration (R)
• Critical Cracking
• Thrust Hazard
• Critical Equipment Loss
• Injury Loss
• Hypoxia
• Critical module Depressurization
Reduce Niii pact
• Environmental Definition
Debris Reduction, Tracking, 	 — 0
& Avoidance
Aftk
Orbital Debris Risk Mitigation ( •^ BOE//VG.
• Penetration
• Ricochet
• Spallation
` 310 Augmented Shields and Materials
Analysis Tool: BUMPER
Ploss	 = 1 - exp(-Nimp.tct x Pp_enetration X Ploss)
impact	 penetration
= I -exp (-Npen x P loss)
penetration
PNCF = PNP ^ R (Chart 20)
Equipment Locations
Hatches Open/Closed
Crew Position in Modules
Sealing/Repair Strategies
Internal Spall Blanket
Analysis Tool: MSCSLn-v
(Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability)
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Smallest particle
which perforates
rear wall
Typical Ballistic Limit Curve
Projectile	 Breakup	 Melt	 Vaporization
intact
Limited test methods - no
	
— Two stage light gas guns —^^^
	 production methods
U	 2	 4	 6	 8	 10	 12	 14	 16	 70
Impact Velocity (kin sec)
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i
ACCEPTABLE 7RISK
DEFINITIO
Is 0.5% risk okay
instead of 0.45%?
Is a penetration
always a failure? 11 YES I
MISSION PARAMETER
DEFINITION
FMEA & HAZARD
ANALYSIS
TRADE STUDIES
• ON ORBIT DETECTION & REPAIR
• FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS
• HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS
• ETC
Boeing Space Station Survivability and Vulnerability
Concluding Remarks
What about 7km/s+?
What about shape effects?
What about particle density?
MIOD
ASSESSMENT
—^ ENVIRONMENTAL	 What about the
MODEL	 uncertainties and
time variability?
,I IMPACT	 PENETRATION'`
TESTING	 MECHANICS
SPACECRAFT	 FIND CRITICAL	 CALCULATE HAZARDCONFIGURATION —^
	 PARTICLES —^	 PROBABILITYDEFINITION	 AL
SYSTEM	 FAILURE
ANALYSES	 MODE DEFINITION
V	 YES
[
ARE RESULTS	 STOP
ACCEPTABLE?
PJ 0
NO
ACCEPTABLE OPTIONS
FOR MITIGATING RISK
Programmatic response
to mitigation options.
"Is this a make work change?"
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•.^	 US Laboratory and Airlock Enhanced.`.	
Meteoroid / Orbital Debris Shielding
Space faking
Outer shield
ao.s ^,»
Multilayer thermal insulation
r4.z;z 1
Intermediate debris shield blanket
Pressure wall
0.20 cm (0.080 in) Aluminum 6001-T6
layers Nextel 312 Style AF-62 (top)
6 layers Kevlar 29 Style 710 (bottom)
encased in Betaclolh
0.45 cm (0.1 88 in) Alnnninum 2219-1'87
Moxlulc Interior
High threat areas on European and Japanese modules are protected with similar shielding
with variations in spacing, thicknesses, and material composition, primarily in the composition
of the intermediate shield.
Nextel is a registered trademark of the 3M company.
Kevlar is a registered trademark of the DuPont company.
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US Laboratory and Airlock
Meteoroid / Orbital Debris "Whipple" Shield
(^^ BOE/NG, A
Space facing;
Outer shield
	 0.20 cm (0.080 in) Aluminum 6061-T6
Multilayer thermal insulation
(4.232 in)
Pressure wall	 0.48 cm (0.188 in) Aluminum 2219-T87
Module Interior
Shields on Node 1, the Pressurized Mating Adapters,
endcones of the US Lab, Airlock, European, and Japanese are similar
with slight variations in spacing, thicknesses, and material composition.
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'may
Cupola Trapezoidal window
V^ BOE/AEG=
Space facing
Outer meteoroid/debris pane
14.3 cm	 Redundant pressure pane(5.625 ill)
Primary pressure pane
0.93 (, in 	 in) Fused Silica
2.54 cm (1.0 in) Fused Silica
2.54 cm (1.0 in) Fused Silica
Inner scratch pane	 1.14 cn ► (0.45 in) Fused Silica
N'lodule Interior
The round window in the clad 01'01C Cupola, the European Cupola windows,
and US module windows are similar with sli-t variations in spacing and thicknesses.
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